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ABSTRACT 
 
This study looks at the effects of manipulating the ambiguity of health risk 
messages on worry and perceived susceptibility. In view of literature that 
indicates robust emotion-congruent effects of anxiety on the interpretation of 
ambiguous information, a procedure was used to manipulate levels of state-
anxiety for a treatment group. 
 
Fifty-two participants completed an experimental task involving the reading of 
six health risk messages on different topics. Each message was followed by a 
short questionnaire to assess levels of worry, risk perception and attributional 
confidence. In addition, the participant’s familiarity with the message as well as 
his/her risk profile for the particular health risk in the message was assessed 
to provide context for their response to the messages. The experiment 
followed a 2 (within-group variables, ambiguous vs. unambiguous) x 2 design 
(between-group variables, state-anxiety induction vs. control group).  
 
It was hypothesized that anxious readers would report higher worry than non-
anxious readers, and that worry would be higher for disambiguated messages. 
Results indicated partial support.  A significant interaction effect was found 
between state-anxiety induction and ambiguity, such that high state-anxious 
readers reported higher worry than non-anxious readers, for unambiguous 
messages only.  
 
It was also hypothesized that risk profile information would predict worry. This 
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The process of resolving ambiguity is both pervasive and central for 
everyday cognition.  
-Blanchette and Richards, 2003 
 
Uncertainty is theorized to be a pervasive experience in modern life. The 
interpretation and negotiation of uncertainty emerges then as a critical 
affective and cognitive task for individuals and groups. Uncertainty, as 
implying unpredictability of outcomes or the existence of multiple outcomes, is 
not only a ubiquitous phenomenological experience; it is also a central and 
pervasive concept in a range of disciplines. In physics, Heisenberg’s 
Uncertainty principle lays down important measurement constraints; in 
psychology, Tolerance of Ambiguity is an important trait variable used to 
predict the response of individuals to situations/stimuli that are unstructured or 
ambiguous; communication has often been defined as uncertainty reducing 
giving uncertainty an important place in communication theory; in 
organizational behavior research, the study of decision making under 
conditions of uncertainty investigates how groups and individuals make 
decisions with access only to incomplete information. However, in none of 
these disciplines does uncertainty occupy as central a place as in the area of 
risk (particularly, risk perception and risk communication theory), since by its 
very definition, risk refers to probabilities, conditions, uncertainties and  
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ambiguities (Gorke and Ruhrmann, 2003; Kahlor, Dunwoody and Griffin,  
2002). Various theoretical conceptions of uncertainty are thus highly relevant 
to the understanding of risk. 
 
Any message about risk to a lay audience can embody (un)certainty at various 
levels. At the stimulus level, uncertainty could be manifest in qualifiers (words 
such as may, perhaps, possibly) or in active disclaimers (which explicitly 
question the validity of a claim) (Stocking, 1999), in addition to direct 
probabilities or percentages of occurrence (for example, a 1 in 100 chance). 
Such a message could then evoke uncertainty (and other related phenomena 
of interest, such as perceived susceptibility, worry, intention to search for more 
information) to varying degrees depending on how an individual evaluates the 
message and how they relate it to their personal lives.  
 
This research investigates the effect on lay readers of risk messages that 
relate specifically to scientific causation claims about health risks and have 
been made ambiguous  through the use of qualifiers. The literature review 
begins with a discussion of how uncertainty is textually encoded in scientific 
journals and the popular media, establishing the relevance of the substantive 
domain under study. This is followed by a discussion of the evolution of the 
concept of uncertainty in communication theory. This section of the literature 
review is of interest from the point of view of the evolution of the concept of 
uncertainty in communication theory than from a methodological point of view. 
The third part of the literature review outlines conceptions of uncertainty from 
psychological theory with a particular emphasis on a cognitive psychological 
paradigm that has heavily influenced this research. Finally, the literature 
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review ends with an application of these theoretical strands to the special case 
of risk communication. 
 
 
‘Uncertainty’ as lexical device in scientific journals and popular media 
 
Risk communication, about health or environmental risks, is unique within 
communication domains in that it requires a translation of scientific and 
technical research into a ‘manageable’ format for lay publics. This process of 
translation can result in information being modified in many ways as it moves 
from the scientific realm to the mass and popular media. One of the crucial 
rhetorical changes that may occur in this transition relates to changes in the 
level of uncertainty that are embodied in the risk message. 
 
Scientists tend to use qualifiers, hedges, caveats and other lexical/discursive 
strategies that stress the tentativeness of their conclusions and invite dialogue 
with their readers (in this case, other scientists) (Hyland, 1996, Rier, 1999). 
Hyland (1996) defines hedging as any linguistic means that ‘indicate either (a) 
a lack of complete commitment to the truth of a proposition, or (b) a desire not 
to express that commitment categorically’.  
 
While it is fairly well documented and agreed upon that scientific articles 
employ a range of rhetorical strategies to hedge and qualify (one in every 50 
words in Hyland’s 1996 study; extremely common as caveats in Results and 
Discussions sections of epidemiological articles in Rier’s 1999 study), the 
question of how the mass / popular media treats such hedges and qualifying 
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statements is less well established. On one hand there are theorists such as 
Fahnestock (1998) and Rier (1999) who take the position that the media tends 
to translate the tentativeness of scientific reports into ‘definitive fact’ (Cole, 
1988). Similarly, Singer (1990) found that journalists tended to omit qualifying 
statements when translating scientific reports into popular media. On the other 
hand, theorists Stocking (1999) argue that more recent studies question these 
earlier insights into the media’s treatment of uncertain science. They suggest 
that with the increasing complexity of scientific problems, scientific uncertainty 
is increasing and that scientists and the media often strategically employ this 
uncertainty. In a similar vein, Stocking (1998) also argues that ‘journalists do 
not always reduce ignorance claims’. There is thus not enough consensus on 
this issue though the question of the effects that qualified risk messages would 
have on lay readers increases in significance if such messages are indeed 
widespread in popular media, as more recent scholarship seems to suggest. 
 
The issue of such effects is not well researched, even though risk messages 
form the basis for the risk perceptions and engagement in preventive 
behaviors of lay publics. There is a wide range of literature, in various 
disciplines, on uncertainty and ambiguity (hedges, qualifiers and caveats seem 
to be useful ways to operationalize the theoretical concepts of ambiguity and 
uncertainty, Stocking, 1999) – however, none of these literatures answers 
quite this question. Thus, while communication theory (such as Problematic 
Integration and Uncertainty Management) study uncertain situations (such as 
initial interpersonal encounters and health situations), there is limited 
experimental work on how readers would respond to uncertain information 
from risk messages. The psychological paradigm proves much more 
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informative for setting up experimental protocols, with a wide range of 
empirical work and a fairly cumulative theory development path, but tends to 
deal with lexical tasks involving words or sentences and rarely uses texts with 
high ecological validity (such as health messages) that are likely to be 
encountered in naturalistic settings.  
 
Although inadequately researched, the question of effects is an important one 
– in at least some cases, a stance of scientific certainty (which often can not 
be sustained over time as differing findings emerged from different studies) 
has resulted in reduced trust amongst the lay public for scientific institutions 
(Wynne, 1996). In a similar vein, though arguing from the opposite direction, 
Rier (1999) claims that in some cases caveats can serve to strengthen claims 
of credibility and inspire confidence.  
 
In order to clarify the primary purpose of this study the difference between 
caveats and qualifiers needs to be outlined – a caveat is more a discursive 
strategy than a qualifier which is lexical. In other words, a caveat could be a 
single paragraph or sentence describing how the results of a scientific study 
are tentative and giving a particular reason for that (such as, small sample 
size, atypical sample, etc.). On the other hand, qualifiers are more like 
rhetorical/lexical strategies that can be used throughout a text and enhance 
the tentativeness of claims without necessarily any specific reason being given 
for this tentativeness. This research focuses on qualifiers since qualifiers are 
more a part of the text than caveats are – caveats tend to be inserted into text 
(and are thus harder to miss being specifically flagged as limitations on the 
validity of scientific claims) while qualifiers can inform the message as a 
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whole. As a result, qualifiers are more likely to be processed differently from 
caveats – for instance, more likely to be processed outside of awareness.  
 
Uncertainty as a construct in communication theory 
 
Within communication theory, the concept of uncertainty has played a pivotal 
role. For instance, Dance (1970) listed uncertainty reduction as one of the key 
definitions of communication. There has been an evolution of the concept of 
uncertainty from a stimulus-response view as embodied in Uncertainty 
Reduction Theory to a more nuanced view that stresses the varied ways in 
which individuals interact with uncertainty as embodied in Uncertainty 
Management Theory. This section elaborates on this evolution, beginning with 
Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) classic formulation of Uncertainty Reduction 
Theory.  
 
The paradigmatic research design for the study of uncertainty in 
communication theory seems to be the initial interaction situation between 
strangers as outlined by Berger and Calabrese (1975).  It was assumed that 
the initial interaction universally involved high levels of felt uncertainty and that 
interactional behaviors (such as amounts of verbal interaction and information 
seeking) resulted in uncertainty reduction in an almost law-like fashion – the 
theory was therefore called Uncertainty Reduction Theory (or URT). 
Uncertainty was theorized as being involved in both proactively predicting as 
well as retroactively explaining another’s (and one’s own) behavior. In this way 
uncertainty was critically related to the making of attributions and efforts to 




Berger and Calabrese’s listed a range of axioms and theorems in an attempt 
to relate crucial communicative behaviors (such as verbal communication, 
information seeking) and interpersonal constructs (such as liking) to 
uncertainty. These axioms reflect the manner in which uncertainty was 
construed in this seminal paper; uncertainty was conceived somewhat as a 
‘given’ in the initial interaction situation – that is, uncertainty was postulated to 
exist as an intrinsic part of the relational environment, similarly perceived by all 
individuals. Uncertainty was also conceived as a state that individuals strive to 
reduce or ameliorate.  
 
Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) theory is considered to be a rational choice 
theory (Bowers, Metts, Duncanson, 1987), because of its focus on information 
seeking and its conception of uncertainty as a cognitive state. Berger (1979) 
himself emphasizes the cognitive nature of uncertainty.  
 
The law-like suppositions of Uncertainty Reduction Theory were modified in 
Berger (1979), which outlined three factors that enhance monitoring of the 
interpersonal situation and to that degree differentially motivate efforts to 
reduce uncertainty – these factors are perceived value, deviance and 
anticipated future interaction. Thus, by his 1979 paper, Berger was qualifying 
his earlier axiomatic claims of uncertainty reduction – uncertainty reduction 
remained a key motive for the individual except that its activation had become 
somewhat contingent on characteristics of the interaction situation which 
functioned as mediating forces. The strict stimulus-response view was 




Sunnafrank (1986) elaborated on one of these mediating factors (perceived 
value/utility) as a critical variable in his ’reformulation of uncertainty reduction 
theory’. His reformulation is prompted at least in part by inconsistent and weak 
empirical support for Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) hypotheses in the case of 
both initial interaction and established relationship situations. Sunnafrank 
argues that most past research has not adequately operationalized uncertainty 
and for example used the same measures (such as filled pause ratio or the 
degree of ahs and ums, Lalljee and Cook, 1973) to assess both the level of 
uncertainty inherent in the situation as well as critical dependent variables 
such as the amount of verbal communicative behavior. In other words, the 
operationalizations have been tautological. 
 
Attempts have been made to use more direct, self-report measures of 
uncertainty, such as attributional confidence (Kellermann and Reynolds, 1990; 
Cioffi, 1991). Kellermann and Reynolds (1990) use a set of scaled items for 
attributional confidence (including statements about confidence, accuracy, 
certainty, empathy) – which they assert is a commonly used ‘inverted 
measure’ of uncertainty. Overall, there does not seem to be enough formal 
research into establishing construct validity for measurements of uncertainty 
and there is pressing need for such research. In addition, there needs to be an 
agreed upon measure for the state of uncertainty that includes both affective 
and cognitive elements. The lack of agreed-upon and widely used 
operationalizations is a serious impediment to theory development in this area. 
Even in the psychological paradigm, as will be seen in the next section, there 
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is no agreed upon operationalization for ambiguity – instead, the stimulus 
situation encodes ambiguity. 
 
Berger’s (1979) inclusion of mediating factors and Sunnafrank’s reformulation 
(1986) helped move the conception of uncertainty away from a stimulus-
response (environmentally induced) model toward a more stimulus-organism-
response view where the environment interacts with individual characteristics. 
This shift can be termed a shift in theorizing about the locus of uncertainty – 
that is, about the site of at which uncertainty is created or experienced.  
 
A more sophisticated account of the locus of uncertainty emerges in the work 
of Eisenberg (1984). Eisenberg talks of ambiguity rather than uncertainty (as 
does much of psychological theory). His construal of ambiguity includes 
connotations of indirectness, lack of clarity, vagueness and disqualification. He 
posits an interactional view of ambiguity which stresses that the interaction 
between environment and the individual’s interpretations is the locus of 
ambiguity. Eisenberg has a number of points of divergence with URT (Berger 
and Calabrese, 1975; Berger, 1979) formulations; to begin with, Eisenberg 
works within the paradigm of organizational communication which is different 
from the paradigm in which URT was formulated (namely, dyadic interpersonal 
communication). He stresses message production and interpretation rather 
than a stimulus-response relationship.  
 
Another important difference is that of their underlying (different) conceptions 
of communication – Eisenberg stresses that communication is not an 
‘epiphenomenon’ and that language and knowledge are interdependent; this 
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contrasts with Berger’s slightly ‘realist’ perspective where individuals directly 
and unproblematically perceive the uncertainty that exists ‘out there’ without  
the mediation of language or interpretation. Most importantly, Eisenberg 
(1984) stresses a strategic use of ambiguity to achieve multiple goals – that is, 
communicators have multiple goals and ambiguity does not imply ineffective 
communication. From a view of man as ‘inquirer’ (Berger, 1979), Eisenberg 
posits a ‘more rhetorical view of communicator as strategist’ (Eisenberg, 
1984). This is the conception adopted by this study – the focus is thus not on 
whether or not there is a master motive to reduce uncertainty but rather on 
how individuals cognitively and affectively interact with situations of uncertainty 
and what resources they bring to bear on the task. 
 
In keeping with a ‘social meaning’ perspective (Shapiro, 2002), Eisenberg 
(1984) criticizes theorists who situate the locus of ambiguity in the message 
itself; Eisenberg differentiates between ambiguity and perceived ambiguity. 
Thus, ambiguity is not a ‘given’ but must be perceived and ambiguity is not 
necessarily something that individuals strive to reduce, but rather a discursive, 
rhetorical strategy that can be purposefully used to navigate important social 
goals. Eisenberg’s (1984) work thus rules out a uni-dimensional response to 
the experience of uncertainty. This notion of multiple, and often conflicting, 
goals was elaborated in the Problematic Integration theory (Babrow, 1992). 
 
Babrow (1992) put forth Problematic Integration Theory (henceforth PI) on 
the basis of 2 paradigmatic propositions: that individuals ‘need’ probabilistic 
and evaluative understandings of the world. Babrow (1992) added to this his 
third proposition – namely, that probabilistic and evaluative understandings are 
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integrated, not just in terms of synchronous co-occurrence, but in terms of 
reciprocal effect and integration with larger networks of beliefs, values, and 
attitudes. Unlike Berger and Calabrese’s (1975) work, Babrow’s theory is not 
embedded in any particular substantive phenomena, such as initial relational 
interactions. Instead, the substantive phenomena that PI deals with (or 
purports to apply to) are broad – health and illness are particularly well 
represented. In addition, a notion of uncertainty as pervasive (a state that an 
individual is constantly navigating and negotiating) is put forth which 
distinguishes between the URT perspective of uncertainty as a recurring 
disequilibrating psychological state.  
 
A major contribution of Babrow’s PI theory is the focus on both cognitive and 
affective elements and the stress on the linking of problematic integrations to 
wider networks of knowledge and attitudes. However, this perspective also 
does not adequately address the question of the experience of uncertainty or 
an operationalization of uncertainty. In fact to some degree, this initial paper 
does not address the notion of the experience / phenomenology of uncertainty 
to any extent. Instead, uncertainty seems to be associated with the 
probabilistic orientation (as opposed to the evaluative orientation). 
 
The substantive phenomenon of chronic illness has been a key site for the 
formulation of Uncertainty Management Theory. Brashers et al (2000) 
studied the experience of AIDS sufferers through qualitative research. 
Uncertainty Management Theory has been found to be more relevant to the 
chronic illness experience than URT. Given that uncertainty is multi-layered, 
the focus of the individual is posited to be not so much a reduction in 
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uncertainty as a management of a multiplicity of goals. The choice of health 
risk messages as stimuli in the current study stems from this focus of recent 
uncertainty theory on the health and illness domain. 
 
Uncertainty Management Theory is a wider conception than the original 
uncertainty reduction theory (Berger and Calabrese, 1975) and includes 
conceptions of strategic use of information to manage (increase, decrease, 
transform, maintain) uncertainty. While the inclination to increase uncertainty 
might seem counterintuitive, it might be especially relevant for the risk 
perception arena – for example, individuals might strive to increase 
uncertainty, as a way to cope with stress, when presented with an uncertain, 
threatening risk messages. This contrasts with Uncertainty Reduction Theory 
where uncertain messages are considered somewhat incomplete – they are 
theorized as messages that individuals will strive to clarify. In the case of risk 
perception however, readers might accept qualifiers and hedges as valid 
information about the scientific process or about the state of knowledge – thus, 
instead of trying to increase or decrease uncertainty they might accept it as it 
is.  
 
Uncertainty Management theory can at times seem to be inefficient in the 
formulation of hypotheses since it stresses a constructivist and strategic 
perspective to uncertainty which might be taken as relativistic to the point 
where general principles are difficult to formulate. While the current research 
ascribes to a constructivist view – that individual readers bring different 
knowledge and dispositions to a risk message, an attempt is made to 




Ambiguity as a construct in psychological theory 
 
Ambiguity/uncertainty has been a widely researched area in both 
communication theory and psychology*. The focus of research and the larger 
paradigmatic view of uncertainty is however different in the two disciplines. In 
psychology, main areas of research have included trait conceptions (tolerance 
of ambiguity scale as a trait), lexical ambiguity resolution (e.g. Gaskell and 
Marslen-Wilson, 2001) and the interaction of ambiguity and anxiety (e.g. 
Blanchette and Richards, 2003; MacLeod and Cohen, 1993). Each of these 
main strands of research is dealt with in turn in this section. 
 
The trait variable, tolerance of ambiguity (also, referred to as tolerance for 
ambiguity, intolerance of ambiguity) was well established by the 1950s. In 
psychology then, ambiguity was theorized as the stimulus feature that 
produces the state of uncertainty and is responded to in different ways by 
different people – it was thus a more complex construct than the stimulus-
response view set forth by Berger and Calabrese (1975) since the trait 
variable is an affective-cognitive structure (Izard, reported in Bowers, Mets and 
Duncancson, 1987) and the focus is on variable responses to ambiguous 
stimuli, mediated by the trait variable. A trait notion implies that stable 
predispositions mediate the perceptual and behavioral response to ambiguity 
– individuals low in tolerance for ambiguity tend to perceive ambiguous 
                                                 
* The term ambiguity is favored in psychology (hence, Tolerance of Ambiguity scale), while the 
term uncertainty is favored in communication research (hence, Uncertainty Reduction Theory, 
Uncertainty Management Theory). The term ambiguity is somewhat more favored in this study 
as it is more influenced by the psychological paradigm. 
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situations as threatening (Norton, 1975) and to strive toward clear-cut or 
unambiguous solutions of problems (Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949).  
 
While the trait approach continues to be a focus, particularly in applied 
research (such as management theory, e.g. Hai and See, 1997), more recent 
research focuses on how ambiguity is interpreted. One aspect of this research 
focuses on lexical ambiguity. The main research question here is how 
individuals resolve lexical ambiguity – that is, how does the listener resolve the 
ambiguity of, for example, homophones (words that sound the same but have 
different meanings). The question put forth by various models concerns 
exactly how important context is in influencing this resolution. Gaskell and 
Marslen-Wilson (2001) point out that modular accounts of ambiguity resolution 
assume that all meanings of ambiguous words are activated regardless of 
context, and then in the next stage, context constrains the selection of the 
most appropriate option. In contrast, interactive accounts posit that context 
guides the activation of alternative meanings to begin with. While there is still 
some contestation between these two types of models, and variations that fall 
between these two, Lucas (1999) in a meta-analysis, concluded that 
contextually-appropriate meanings of ambiguous words are more significantly 
activated than the contextually-inappropriate meanings; that is, the context of 
the word (or, the sentence and larger conversational/textual frame within 
which it was encountered) serves to guide the interpretation. 
 
Research on lexical ambiguity resolution provides an investigation into basic 
cognitive processes of language and the cognitive activation that occurs in 
response to ambiguous words, both acoustically and semantically. A third 
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major strand of research that can be identified in research into ambiguity, and 
which is of central importance to the current research, is a cognitive based 
experimental paradigm that focuses on anxiety and ambiguity, and the effects 
of mood states on cognitive processes – thus, when this paradigm investigates 
words, it extends the lexical ambiguity resolution paradigm by investigating 
how mood states influence lexical resolution and other cognitive processes.  
 
Within this cognitive based experimental paradigm, robust effects for the 
emotion-congruent interpretation of ambiguous stimuli have been found 
(Blanchette and Richards, 2003). The emotion-congruent view implies that 
individuals tend to interpret ambiguous stimuli in line with the emotional state 
that they’re in. The feeling state of anxiety is particularly well represented in 
this research (Calvo et al, 2003). The research into the effects of anxiety on 
the processing of ambiguous stimuli focuses on both state and trait anxiety (for 
instance, MacLeod and Cohen (1993) focus on trait-anxiety while Blanchette 
and Richards (2003) focus on state-anxiety) – findings on interpretive biases 
of anxiety tend to be similar for both trait- and state-anxiety. The present 
research focuses on state-anxiety. State anxiety can be defined as a feeling 
state that varies over time in its intensity and is contrasted with trait anxiety 
which is a relatively stable predisposition to ‘perceive a wide range of stimulus 
situations as threatening’ (Schmukle and Egloff, 2004).  
 
The effects of anxiety are classified as three anxiety-relevant cognitive biases 
(MacLeod and Cohen, 1993) – attentional, memory related, and interpretive. 
The attentional bias refers to the finding that anxious individuals show 
selective attention for threat-related information – that is, a higher encoding of 
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threat related over neutral stimuli; also, as Calvo et al (2003) note, threat 
related information already encoded should be ‘especially retrievable’. The 
memory-related bias implies a higher recall for threat-related information 
(there is inconsistent support for this bias, Calvo et al, 2003). Finally, the 
interpretive bias refers to the tendency of anxious individuals to draw more 
threatening interpretations from ambiguous information. Interpretive biases 
have been found for both trait and state-anxiety (Blanchette and Richards, 
2003) and are the most pertinent for this study as they refer specifically to 
ambiguous stimuli.  
 
The basic experimental paradigm in the study of ambiguity and anxiety 
involves presenting an ambiguous word (generally one that could be 
interpreted in either a threatening or non-threatening manner). If the word is a 
homograph (e.g. a word such as stroke, which has the same spelling as 
another word but a different meaning), it might be followed by a word that 
implies a more or less threatening interpretation (e.g. heart or cat) in a lexical 
decision task. Reaction times to these lexical decision tasks are then used to 
ascertain attentional and interpretive biases. For instance, the degree to which 
more threatening interpretations (such as heart in response to stroke) are 
responded to, is taken as evidence of an interpretive bias. Recall tests are 
used to ascertain memory-related biases. The stimuli most often used include 
single words (homographs and homophones are often used, e.g. Blanchette 
and Richards, 2003) or short sentences (e.g. MacLeod and Cohen, 1993, 
Hock et al, 1996) and occasionally short paragraphs, for instance describing 
social situations (e.g. Mathews and Mackintosh, 2000). The most commonly 
used paradigm, then, does not include texts such as health messages or other 
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naturalistic texts that must be evaluated in terms of relevance for the self and 
then used for decision making. This paradigm also does not include any 
operationalization for ambiguity – instead, ambiguity is operationalized at the 
level of the stimulus and threatening interpretations are operationalized as 
both the level of ratings and reaction times to threatening vs. non-threatening 
interpretations.  
 
Blanchette and Richards (2003) argue that while emotion-congruent effects 
related to anxiety (such as the attentional and interpretive biases) exist in 
some situations they might be overridden by contextual information in more 
complex / naturalistic settings. They stress the importance of context in 
resolving and interpreting ambiguity. They argue that given additional 
information, an anxious individual might not make a threatening interpretation 
of ambiguous information if contextual information helps resolve the ambiguity.  
 
While Blanchette and Richards (2003) raise the issue of interpretation of 
ambiguity in more naturalistic settings, they continue to use the traditional 
paradigm of a homophone (die/dye) spelling task to investigate the interaction 
of anxiety and contextual information in the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli. 
Participants heard the homophone (die/dye) and simultaneously saw the 
contextual cue (death or hair depending on whether the emotional or neutral 
context was being used in that trial). They then wrote down the target word 
they had heard (the spelling task). Blanchette and Richards (2003) found that 
contextual information constrained interpretation (that is, there was a main 
effect for context on interpretation). They also found an interaction effect for 
anxiety and context – in that, anxious participants were more sensitive to 
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contextual information than low anxious participants (although there was no 
main effect for mood). Thus, the effect of anxiety was mediated by the 
presentation of contextual information leading to mood-incongruent effects. 
They also consider whether the emotionality hypothesis is more relevant in 
this case – the emotionality hypothesis predicts that anxiety is related to 
increased attention to emotional stimuli in general (and not just threatening or 
negative information). They find that this is in fact the case – anxiety increases 
sensitivity to contextual information regardless of the emotional content of the 
ambiguous material.  
 
The special case of risk communication 
 
Threat vs. non-threat 
The positive findings in the psychological paradigm are based on a stimulus 
model where ambiguous stimuli are constructed so as to have either a 
threatening or a non-threatening interpretation. Risk communication, however, 
can be considered a special case of ambiguity in that it always deals with 
potentially threatening information that is associated with a probability of 
occurrence (Gorke and Ruhrmann, 2003; Kahlor, Dunwoody and Griffin, 
2002). The question of interpretation then is not about whether a threatening 
or non-threatening interpretation was made, but rather about degree of threat 
ascribed to the stimulus. Thus, while the psychological paradigm uses reaction 
times for threatening vs. non-threatening sentence continuations as the 
standard response protocol, the current research uses a scaled variable that 





In addition, risk messages are already ambiguous (even when they do not 
contain any ambiguating words) since it is understood that they deal not with 
absolutes but with relatives, and probabilities. This study then is not about the 
effects of ambiguity, since all risk messages are ambiguous at some level – 
rather, it is about the effect of ambiguating words or qualifiers over and above 
the ambiguity that any risk message implies. Thus, even when the messages 
used in this study are referred to as ambiguous and un-ambiguous messages, 
it is understood that both imply a certain base level of ambiguity which is 
inherent in any risk message. 
 
This ambiguity can further refer not only to the strength of the causal claim (X 
leads to Y as opposed to X might lead to Y) – which as indicated above is 
compounded by the inherent ambiguity of risk information – but also to the 
degree to which a particular message is perceived as applicable to oneself. In 
other words, an ambiguous stimulus can create ambiguity as a felt experience 
in two ways – either one is uncertain about the strength of the causal claim 
being made and/or one is uncertain about the degree to which this causal 
claim applies to oneself. The latter (applicability to oneself, which can also be 
cast as perceived susceptibility and risk profile/context, as explicated below) 
can also explain why contextually appropriate interpretations are made – 
context serves to constrain meaning about at least one facet of ambiguity, that 
relating to applicability to oneself. In other words, ambiguity (over and above 
that inherent in any risk message) can be conceptualized as stemming from 
both the qualifiers in the stimulus and from the interpretations that personal 




Since a risk message implies a threat, an ambiguous risk message is likely to 
imply a lesser threat since the very knowledge claim on which the threat is 
based is cast as uncertain. This paper therefore advances the hypothesis that 
ambiguous risk messages will result in lower interpretations of threat than un-
ambiguous messages. Anxiety will likely result in higher interpretations of 
threat for un-ambiguous messages due to the activation of threat related 
information, which in interaction with the higher threat implied by the certainty 
of claims, creates a reinforcing effect.  
 
As regards un-ambiguous risk messages, it is difficult to make predictions 
based on the psychological paradigm as this paradigm does not directly use 
un-ambiguous messages. This is a limitation of the psychological paradigm’s 
use of individual words (and sometimes even sentences) as the experimental 
task – it is not always possible to have un-ambiguous controls (that is, un-
ambiguous versions of the ambiguous stimuli). In the case of an ambiguous 
sentence, while presenting un-ambiguous control messages to another 
experimental group is possible, it is not generally done (although un-
ambiguous messages are often used in the recognition task, these are not 
strictly controls). The current research uses texts that have two versions: an 
ambiguous version and an un-ambiguous version, thus providing a more 







The role of context 
Studies within the psychological paradigm tend to use single words or 
sentences in isolation. In real life discourse, such words are likely to be 
encountered in sentences/paragraphs which provide context for their 
interpretation. Even more important for this study, ambiguous words are likely 
to make ambiguous entire messages and in the case of health risk messages, 
the reader’s own risk profile (risk factors, knowledge about their own behavior 
that helps interpret claims about the severity and susceptibility of risks) is likely 
to serve as such a context.  
 
As Blanchette and Richards (2003) indicate, anxious individuals make more 
contextually appropriate interpretations; however, in the case of health 
messages contextually appropriate could imply a range of hypotheses 
including a closer relationship between context/risk profile and worry for 
anxious individuals or a higher discrimination between ambiguous and 
unambiguous messages or even a faster/deeper activation of context related 
information.  
 
Further, for the current research, context means something somewhat 
different from what it meant for Blanchette and Richards (2003) or for lexical 
ambiguity theory. For Blanchette and Richards (2003), context was a within 
subjects factor that they manipulated at the level of context cues presented 
before the stimuli material. They were attempting to extend earlier work on the 
emotion-congruent effects of anxiety by considering a situation where context 
could constrain the interpretation of ambiguity. The context, was thus 
something that could be provided or withheld by the researchers in an 
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experimental design. On the other hand, for the purposes of this study, context 
also refers to the risk profile of each reader for a particular message. It thus 
includes not only the context provided by message structure and continuation 
sentences but also that provided by each reader’s personal frame for 
interpreting that specific message – it is the past experiences, meanings and 
self-specific knowledge of behavior that can be assumed to be activated when 
a reader encounters a risk message and then subsequently guides their 
interpretation of the message. It is not only supplied by the experimental 
context, but also functions as a covariate. 
 
Although Blanchette and Richards (2003) use contextual probes, these probes 
apply to the semantic meaning of the words alone. The context they provide is 
not in the realm of the kind of personal knowledge about oneself and one’s 
own behavior that would make one or the other interpretation more relevant. 
This study uses a conception of context that more strongly evokes personal 
meanings and situates relevance.  
 
The design of the current research utilizes naturalistic texts that have a higher 
affinity with real-world decisions involving ambiguity. The ambiguous texts 
used in this research are more akin to knowledge claims that are in dispute. 
Homophone and homograph tasks are not coherent arguments, nor do they 
claim for themselves any application to the reader’s life.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, ambiguous messages not only imply an 
ambiguity about the strength of causal claims, but can also create ambiguity 
about the degree to which these claims are perceived as applying to oneself. 
23 
 
This source of ambiguity can be conceived as existing in any risk message 




How is worry and susceptibility for health risks affected by ambiguity, anxiety 




H1 In keeping with the emotion-congruent effect, that state-anxiety induction 
will result in higher levels of worry and susceptibility ratings for both 
ambiguous and un-ambiguous messages.  
H2 Ambiguous messages will result in lower levels of worry and susceptibility 
than un-ambiguous messages 
H3 Contextually appropriate interpretations will be made in that a higher risk 






This chapter elaborates on the research procedure followed in this study. It 
begins with details on the manipulation of between- and within-subjects 
independent variables, followed by a discussion of the main dependent 
variables, a note on procedure and a final sum up on research design.   
 
Manipulation of between-subjects variable: State-anxiety Induction 
 
State-anxiety is a mood state that ‘varies in intensity and fluctuates over time’ 
(Schmukle and Egloff, 2004). Blanchette and Richards (2003) used a state-
anxiety manipulation where participants were told that they were being filmed 
while they completed the experimental task, and that their facial expressions 
would be analyzed. This particular induction procedure did not prove to be 
successful in a pilot test – that is, it did not seem to induce state-anxiety as 
evidenced by the difference between pre- and post-task measures. In addition, 
the drawbacks of this manipulation are that there is a possibility that having a 
video camera on during the entire reading task could detract cognitive 
resources, thus introducing a potential confound. A slightly more rigorous 
induction procedure was employed that involved a video camera and a public 
speaking task. Schmukle and Egloff (2004) use the public speaking task as a 
means to induce state-anxiety and report it to be an effective manipulation in 




Manipulation of within-subjects variables: Stimuli Materials 
 
The key stimuli used in this study were 6 messages about a range of health 
risks – Lyme disease, acrylamides in fried foods, a link between coffee and 
osteoporosis, a link between cell phone usage and brain tumors, high 
cholesterol in young people, and a link between jogging and knee arthritis.  
 
Attempts were made to select message topics that are not as commonly 
targeted to youth populations as are messages about, for example, alcohol 
and STDs. An attempt was also made to include health risks that do not have 
a widely known scientific consensus (by this count a topic like AIDS would not 
qualify as its etiology is well known). This was done to limit the role of prior 
knowledge and also to limit the possibility that ambiguation would be 
considered implausible (for instance, ambiguation of a message about AIDS 
etiology is likely to be considered implausible). 
 
Messages were created by searching health websites on the Internet and 
synthesizing multiple sources to create a short message; two versions were 
then formulated for each message – an ambiguous version and an un-
ambiguous version (average message length was 80 words for the ambiguous 
messages and 64 words for the un-ambiguous messages). The ambiguous 
version was formulated by adding a range of qualifying or hedging words 
(such as might, seem, perhaps, possibly, probably, sort of, suggested) to the 
message. Guidelines for ambiguation of messages were taken from Hyland 




Each message was preceded by an introduction that mentioned the topic of 
the message and served to draw the attention of the participant to the fact that 
a new message was going to appear on their screen. Each message was then 
followed by a set of questions that appeared in the same order after each 
message. These questions are the dependent measures for this study. (The 
two versions of the six messages, together with introductions, are included in 
the Appendix A).  
 
In sum, message type (6 different topics) and message versions (ambiguous 




An ambiguity scale was used to assess tolerance of ambiguity, an important 
trait variable in the psychological paradigm. The ambiguity scale was taken 
from a website about online surveys, accessed at 
http://www.prenhall.com/whetten_dms/chap1_4.html. A sample of this scale 
can be seen in the Appendix B. The scale consists of 16 statements, on a 7 
point agree-disagree scale. The ambiguity scale was the first task that 
respondents completed on entering the experimental room.  
 
A multi-item anxiety scale was prepared that included items referring to 
feelings of anxiety, tenseness, excitement and nervousness. Items were taken 
from Spielberger's 20 item State Anxiety Inventory (1983, accessed at 
http://www.psych.uncc.edu/pagoolka/StateAnxiety-intro.html) and then 
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converted into an 8 item (6 anxiety related items from the State Anxiety 
Inventory and 2 distractors related to hunger and fatigue), 10 point bipolar 
scale in an attempt to improve discrimination. A sample of this scale can be 
seen in the Appendix C. The same set of items was used to assess anxiety 
before and after the experimental task, resulting in pre- and post-task state-
anxiety measures. Blanchette and Richards (2003) use a single-item state-
anxiety measure – this provided some precedent and rationale for using an 
ad-hoc multi-item scale, instead of a proprietary validated scale such as the 
State Anxiety Inventory. 
 
Dependent measures and covariates 
 
A range of dependent variables were measured for each message, including 
attributional confidence, relevance, perceived susceptibility, and worry; the 
variables covered both affective and cognitive measures (the exact wording of 
questions can be found in the Appendix D). Of particular relevance to this 
study are: 
• Attributional confidence – this variable serves as an inverted measure 
of perceived ambiguity or uncertainty of a message (Kellermann and 
Reynolds, 1990). While the original conceptualization of this message 
was formulated for interpersonal interaction situations, the variable is 
being used for message effects in this case. The wording of this 
measure refers to the confidence that a reader feels in using that 
particular message to guide decision making about health. Similar to 
Kellermann and Reynolds (1990) conception, this is an inverted 
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measure, in that lower attributional confidence implies a higher level of 
perceived uncertainty.  
• Perceived Susceptibility – The particular question employed to assess 
this variable in this research refers specifically to the perceived 
likelihood or susceptibility to a particular health risk. The wording of this 
question is fairly standard in the risk perception domain (for instance, 
Windschitl and Wells, 1996) and this is an important variable in risk 
communication research.  
• Worry – This variable is an affective variable that reflects concern 
evoked by a message. It is being employed as an operationalization of 
the degree to which threatening interpretations are made of a risk 
message. 
 
While these measures reflect dependent variables, two other variables, risk 
profile information, as a measure of context, and familiarity, as a binary 
measure of prior knowledge, reflect covariates or, more precisely, contextual 
variables. They are being termed as such since these are likely to be 
message-independent measures – in other words, they are independent of the 
particular version of the message, but are linked to the basic topic of the 
message instead. They refer to the context within which the messages are 
likely to have been read and interpreted by the participant in the experimental 
task; these two variables represent then the particular pattern of prior 
knowledge that would have guided reading and interpretation.  
• Risk profile information – This measure assessed personal risk profile 
information in a unique way for each message – thus, the  message 
about coffee drinking and its link to osteoporosis assessed risk profile 
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by asking how many cups of coffee the participant drank while the 
message about jogging and its link to knee arthritis assessed risk profile 
by asking whether or not the participant tends to jog on a hard surface.  
• Familiarity – This measure was a binary (yes/no) measure of whether or 
not the reader had heard about the particular message topic before. 
 
These questions were asked in an invariant order after each of the six 
messages that participants were exposed to. The order of questioning was as 
follows: worry, perceived susceptibility, risk profile information, attributional 
confidence, motivation to seek more information, relevance, familiarity. The 
rationale behind this order was to ask affective questions related to worry as 
soon as the message was read; to ask perceived susceptibility questions 
before risk profile information was explicitly activated; to ask the questions 
which seemed to be not as dependent on recency, such as familiarity and 
relevance of the topic, at the end. 
 
Theorists, such as MacLeod and Cohen (1993) and Hock et al (1996), stress 
the importance of unobtrusive measurements, such as reaction time, as being 
critical in avoiding response bias effects. The experimental software recorded 
the reading latencies and response latencies for all messages and dependent 
variables. The reading latencies were operationalized as the time elapsing 
between the participant clicking NEXT on the introduction to the message and 
then clicking NEXT on having read the message. Response latencies were 
operationalized as the time it took participants to read the each question 
(representing dependent variables and covariates) as it appeared after the 





The sample for this study consisted of 52 undergraduate students drawn from 
Communication classes (though not from either Risk Communication or 
Science Communication). Participants received extra credit for their 
participation in the study. There were 26 participants each in the treatment 
(anxiety-induction) and control group. 
 
Participants were assigned randomly to the treatment (state-anxiety induction) 
or control condition. Within each condition, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of six message orders, created so as to control for order 
effects. Each participant read 3 ambiguous and 3 un-ambiguous messages in 
random order. Participants were told that the study was about how students 
read and respond to health messages prepared for a student population. This 
instruction was an attempt to increase involvement with the messages. 
Participants completed the experiment individually. The testing room, laptop, 
and other settings (such as orientation of furniture in the room), were the same 
for all participants. In addition, the researcher was the experimenter for the 
entire study.  
 
In the anxiety induction group, participants filled out the ambiguity scale, 
followed by the pre-task state-anxiety scale. They were then informed that a 
separate part of the study involved them making a speech about a health topic 
and that they would be videotaped while doing so – it was at this point that the 
consent form was introduced (state-anxiety was measured prior to participants 
being informed of the speech task – this was done to create an equal 
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condition for the pre-task state-anxiety measure with the control group). They 
were told that the speeches would then be rated for the logic of their 
arguments and also to understand how people think about health topics. They 
were then given a couple of minutes to ‘prepare’ their speech while the 
researcher set up a video camera on a tripod right in front of the table where 
the participant was preparing their speech. Participants made a speech lasting 
a couple of minutes. They were allowed to stop whenever they felt they had 
said what they wanted to.  
 
After making the speech, participants were told to move on to the ‘message 
part’ of the study and they completed the experimental task of message 
reading. The anxiety induction manipulation was thus set up to seem a 
different part of the study – this was done so that it created more of a priming 
situation and so as to not detract from the cognitive resources being allocated 
to the experimental reading task (which might have occurred if, for instance, 
participants were told that the speech would be made after the reading task). 
Further, none of the messages used in the study related to the topic of the 
speech in the anxiety induction phase - ‘whether smoking should be allowed in 
public places’. After reading the messages, participants completed the post-
anxiety scale.  
 
In the control group, participants completed the ambiguity and anxiety scales 
and went straight to the reading task. The reading task was the main 
experimental task and required participants to read six health messages in a 
self-paced manner; in other words, participants could control the speed with 




At the completion of the experiment, participants were debriefed. Participants 
in the state-anxiety induction condition were informed that the aim of the public 
speaking task was to enhance their concern levels and that their speeches 
would not be analyzed in any way. The process by which messages were 
made ambiguous was explained to all participants. In addition, participants 
were reminded that if they were really concerned about any of these health 
risks, they should either search for information about it themselves or ask a 




The study used a mixed experimental design –  state-anxiety-induction served 
as the between-subjects factor while ambiguation of messages served as the 
within-subjects factor. Further, the design was partially nested – it was nested 
in the sense that repeated measurements were nested within individuals who 
were then nested within the treatment vs. control group (Bordens and Abbott, 
2002); it was partially nested in that participants received either the ambiguous 
or un-ambiguous version of each of 6 messages – that is, participants were 
not exposed to all versions of all messages and if they received the 
ambiguous version of message 1, they would not receive the un-ambiguous 
version of that same message.  
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CHAPTER THREE - RESULTS 
 
This section focuses first on sample characteristics, followed by assessments 
of the efficacy of the experimental manipulations. Multi-level models with worry 





There were 26 participants each in the treatment (anxiety-induction) and 
control group, with an overall mean age of 20.4 years (there was no significant 
age difference between the treatment and control group) and of which 65% 
were women (there was no significant difference in the gender make-up of the 




Items 1, 3, 7 and 8 were reverse coded so that higher scores on the state-
anxiety scale implied higher levels of state anxiety. A composite pre- and post-
task anxiety score was created by summing all items other than item 1 and 4 
(which were distractor items about fatigue and hunger respectively) and item 3 
(which was an item about excitement and was found to compromise the 
internal consistency of the scale as measured by Cronbach’s alpha). The 
resulting scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .643 for the pre-task measure and 
.689 for the post-task measure. The pre- and post-task measures were then 
used to create a pre- and post-index.
34 
 
This section of the results focuses on whether the anxiety-induction method 
(or the manipulation of the between subjects variable) was effective. Two-
tailed independent samples t-tests were conducted to ascertain whether the 
state-anxiety group and the control group differed in their state-anxiety levels 
prior to the manipulation of state-anxiety, i.e. on the pre-task state-anxiety 
measure. None of the state-anxiety items showed any significant differences 
between the two groups – in other words, there were no pre-existing 
differences in state-anxiety between the two groups.  
 
In order to assess whether there was a significant difference between pre- and 
post-task measures of any of the state-anxiety items, an overall anxiety 
differential was calculated for the scale, by subtracting the pre-task index from 
the post-task index. Positive anxiety differentials, then, indicate an increase in 
anxiety over the course of the experiment. At the overall level, independent 
sample two-tailed t-tests were insignificant in establishing an anxiety 
differential between the treatment and control groups (t (49) = -1.1420, p = 
.162). 
 
Anxiety differentials were then calculated for each item on the scale.  
 
For the control group, one anxiety differential was significant, according to a 
two-tailed one sample t-test, against the criterion zero (that is, the null 
hypothesis stated that the anxiety differential was equal to zero). This item 
was Item 2, and referred to the degree to which the participant felt tense, 
t(25)= -3.333, p = .003. However, the mean difference (from zero) in this case 
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was -.9231, indicating that anxiety as measured by this item, actually fell over 
the course of the experimental task for the control group. 
 
For the state-anxiety induction group (or the treatment group), one anxiety 
differential was significant, item 6, referring to the degree to which the 
participant felt unpleasant, t (25) = 4.028, p = .000, with a mean difference 
(from 0) of 0.880. Further, this anxiety differential was also significantly 
different between the two groups (that is, the treatment group showed a 
greater increase in unpleasantness over the course of the experimental task, 
than the control group, t(49) = -2.524, p = .015. 
 
In sum, there was only one anxiety item that showed a significant increase 
between pre- and post-measurement for the treatment group (and this item did 
not show a difference in the control group). This piece of evidence is not 
enough to conclude that state-anxiety was in fact induced – although this is a 
tested induction procedure for state-anxiety, it is possible that it did not 




The ambiguity scale was found to be multi-dimensional with a Cronbach’s 





The primary statistical technique used for assessing the effects of the 
experimental manipulation and covariates was multi-level modeling. This 
technique is especially appropriate for situations where data is hierarchically 
structured (Kreft and De Leeuw, 2002) or nested. It is also suitable for 
repeated measures (which is a special case of nesting, as observations are 
nested within individuals) where not every participant receives every treatment 
(in this research, not every subject received all versions of the six messages – 
i.e. they either received the ambiguous or the un-ambiguous version for each 
message). Finally, multi-level modeling is useful to control for intra-group 
correlations (in this case, correlations within the same treatment / control 
group or correlation of observations within the same participant) – in other 
words, it controls for the similarity that comes from membership within a group 
(whether that ‘group’ is a treatment group or a group of measurements within 
the same person).  
 
The main analysis for this study is the effects of Treatment, Message, 
Ambiguity and Context on worry. The multi-level models were run step-by-
step, starting with the between-group variable (control group vs. state-anxiety 
induction / treatment group) and moving onto the within-group variables of 
message and ambiguity. These were the three variables that were 
experimentally manipulated in this study.  Context was then entered into the 







Effects of State-Anxiety  
A repeated effects model was run with Treatment (state-anxiety induction vs. 
control group) as the only fixed effect specified for the dependent variable of 
worry. There was a significant main effect of Treatment in the hypothesized 
direction (F (df:49.765) = 2.771, p = .102; since this is a directional hypothesis 
we can consider p/2 = .051 and conclude that there is a significant effect of 
treatment). That is, participants in the state-anxiety induction treatment group 
interpreted the health risk messages as more threatening, i.e. worrisome (M = 
2.676, SE = .117) than participants in the control group for whom state-anxiety 
levels were not manipulated (M = 2.401, SE = .117).  
 
The next model was run with Treatment and an additional variable, Message 
(the six different messages used) as main effects; an interaction term between 
the two was also specified. The Message variable had a significant main effect 
(F (df:84.671) = 3.605, p = .005) indicating that the topic of the message itself 
resulted in significantly different levels of worry. Pair-wise comparisons for the 
six messages indicate that Message 2, the message about Lyme disease, 
resulted in significantly lower worry (M = 2.077, SE = .159) than most other 
messages (for example, Message 3 about knee arthritis had the highest worry 
ratings, with M = 2.885, SE = .175). 
 
There was no significant interaction of Treatment and Message  
(F (df:84.671) = 1.054, p = .392) indicating that state-anxiety resulted in higher 
interpretations of threat as manifested in ratings of worry, regardless of the 
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type of message that the reader was exposed to. This result then indicates the 
generalizability or robustness of Treatment effects. 
 
Effects of Ambiguation  
The next multi-level model was run by adding Ambiguity (each respondent 
received three ambiguous and three un-ambiguous messages) as a variable in 
the above model and specifying all possible interaction terms for the three 
main effects of Treatment, Message and Ambiguity. A significant main effect 
for ambiguity was found (F (df:236.584) = 5.485, p = .020) in the expected 
direction – ambiguous messages resulted in lower worry (M = 2.407, SE = 
.104) than un-ambiguous messages (M = 2.703, SE = .104). There was no 
significant interaction between Ambiguity and Message (F (df:85.476) = 1.129, 
p = .351) indicating that the effects of ambiguity on worry were independent of 
the type of message that the reader was exposed to. There was also no 
significant three-way interaction between Treatment, Message and Ambiguity 
(F (df:85.476) = .552, p = .737).  
 
Further, there was a significant interaction between Treatment and Ambiguity 
(F (df:236.584) = 3.875, p = .050), implying that the effects of Treatment and 
Ambiguity differ at different levels of these variables. In order to further specify 
the interaction between Treatment and Ambiguity, the model was re-run 
retaining the significant terms, Treatment, Message, Ambiguity and the 





The graph in Figure 1, illustrates the interaction between Treatment and 















  Figure 1. Worry ratings for ambiguous and un-ambiguous messages 
 
 
Figure 1 indicates that participants in the state-anxiety group showed a higher 
degree of worry for un-ambiguous messages than for ambiguous messages. 
On the other hand, participants in the control group did not show significant 
differences in worry for the two different types of messages. This indicates that 
Treatment and Ambiguity main effects are largely (if not entirely) a result of 
differences in the way in which participants in the state-anxiety group 




This finding partially supports Hypothesis 1 and 2. Hypothesis 1 stated that 
state-anxiety induction will result in higher levels of worry for both ambiguous 
and un-ambiguous messages, while Hypothesis 2 postulated that ambiguous 
messages will result in lower levels of worry than un-ambiguous messages. 
Due to the interaction effect, Hypothesis 1 and 2 hold only for anxious 
participants and un-ambiguous messages.  
 
Effect of Context* 
The above analysis reflects the impacts of experimentally manipulated 
variables on worry. This section analyzes the effects of context, which can be 
considered a covariate, on worry. As argued earlier, personal context or risk 
profile can rightfully be considered a covariate or akin to an independent 
variable. Statistical analyses further support this in that there is no significant 
effect of Treatment or Ambiguity on risk profile information (or context) – that 
is, different experimental manipulations did not affect the risk profile 
information evoked (in other words, state-anxiety induction or ambiguation of 
messages did not result in participants reporting a higher or lower risk profile). 
Message has a significant main effect on risk profile but this is at likely to be 
because the population being studied has higher risk profiles for certain of the 
health risks being studied than others. 
 
A standardized risk profile or context variable was then added to the multi-
level model of worry. The risk profile variable was standardized in order to 
account for the disparity in units. The disparity arose since risk profile was 
                                                 
* Context here refers to the risk profile information that was gathered for each participant for 




measured with a different message-specific question for each message (for 
instance, one risk profile question focused on number of cups of coffee drunk 
per day while another was a nominal question asking the participant if they 
had ever done any of the following). (See Appendix D for more details on the 
questions asked to ascertain risk profile for each message). 
 
On adding this standardized context variable to the above multi-level model of 
worry, a significant main effect was found (F= 48.290, p = .000), indicating a 
robust effect of risk profile on worry in the expected direction (a positive 
influence of risk profile on worry, such that a higher risk profile results in more 
worry; in other words, contextually appropriate interpretations are made. There 
were no significant interactions of context with Treatment, Message or 
Ambiguity. The model was run again without these insignificant interactions 
(the interaction of Treatment and Ambiguity had reduced in significance; F = 
3.587, p = .059) 
 
Since the addition of context does not impact main effects of Treatment, 
Message or Ambiguity we can conclude that its effect is orthogonal to these 
effects. In other words, the effects of risk profile information on worry are not 
affected by either the treatment condition or message ambiguity. 
 
This also implies that the effect of ambiguity, as a message variable, on worry 
is independent of the effect of risk profile, an individual variable constraining 




These findings offer strong support for Hypothesis 3 which predicted that 
contextually appropriate interpretations of threat would be made.  
 
Predicting Perceived Susceptibility 
 
The same step-by-step model as above was run for perceived susceptibility. In 
the final model, the only two variables that attain significance in predicting 
perceived susceptibility are risk profile (F (df:277.516) = 100.761, p = .000) 
and message (F (df:74.013) = 6.394, p = .000). Thus, neither Treatment nor 
Ambiguity have a predictive significance for perceived susceptibility – anxious 
readers are not more likely to perceive themselves as more susceptible, nor 
did ambiguous messages evoke lower susceptibility than un-ambiguous 
messages. For the case of susceptibility then, neither Hypothesis 1 nor 2 were 
supported. However, Hypothesis 3 was supported in that personal context or 
risk profile was a strong predictor of susceptibility. 
 
Table 1 below summarizes the worry and perceived susceptibility ratings for 
the two independent variables that were manipulated in this study. The 
interaction effect between Treatment and Ambiguity can be clearly seen for 





Table 1. Worry and susceptibility for by type of message and treatment* 
 
WORRY Control Group Treatment Group 
Ambiguous  2.389 2.408 
Un-ambiguous 2.438 2.97 
      
SUSCEPTIBILITY Control Group Treatment Group 
Ambiguous  42.022 40.412 
Un-ambiguous 40.916 44.342 
 
Attributional confidence and the Ambiguity manipulation 
 
Was ambiguity perceived – that is, did the ambiguous messages result in 
lower attributional confidence as was expected of this dependent measure? 
This question is not being asked as a manipulation check. Building on 
O’Keefe’s (2003) argument about manipulation checks, the messages were 
different, and therefore the question is then one of whether they were 
perceived as such. Participants were asked to report their level of confidence 
in each message as an inverted measure of ambiguity; with the assumption 
that lower levels of attributional confidence imply higher levels of perceived 
ambiguity*. The mean attributional confidence scores indicate no significant 
main effect for Ambiguity (F (df:233.727) = .022, p = .883). As mentioned 
(pg.19), ambiguity (over and above that inherent in any risk message) can be 
conceptualized as stemming from both the qualifiers in the stimulus and from 
the interpretations that personal context or risk profile brings to bear. It would 
                                                 
* Worry is measured on a five point scale, while susceptibility is measured on a 0 to 100 scale. 
* The exact question asked of participants was: How CONFIDENT are you in using the 
information presented in this message to guide your health decisions? Please enter a number 




appear that attributional confidence as a ratings measure does not tap into 
ambiguity at the level of the qualifiers in the message.  
 
While there was a significant main effect for Message and a significant 
interaction between Message and Ambiguity, there was no pattern to this 
interaction (that is, ambiguous messages did not consistently receive lower 
attributional confidence scores). Thus, ambiguity did not predict attributional 
confidence in any systematic way.  
 
However, risk profile information did predict attributional confidence (F 
(df:224.969) = 6.943, p = .009). In other words, the higher a participant’s 
reported message-specific risk profile, the higher their reported confidence in a 
message. That is, the ambiguity that stems from uncertainty about whether or 
not a message applies to one is captured in attributional confidence. This 
might be a result of the personalizing tone of the question ‘how confident are 
you’ which might be activating risk profile information or contextual information 
in its interpretation.  
 
Further, Ambiguity did significantly predict the time taken to make decisions 
about attributional confidence (F (df:227.590) = 5.757, p = .017), with 
ambiguous messages resulting in a higher response latency (M = 8054.2, SE 
= 372.4) than un-ambiguous messages (M = 7113.1, SE = 372.4). This might 
be evidence of an effective measure of ambiguity. As Hock et al (1996) point 
out, the time taken to make self-report ratings is as important as the ratings 
themselves. A higher response latency implies more time taken to reach 
conclusions and hence a possibility that the respondent was considering more 
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than one response. Finally, risk profile information also significantly predicted 
time taken to make conclusions about attributional confidence (F (df:256.626) 
= 4.658, p =  .032). Thus, those with a higher risk profile thought longer about 
their degree of confidence in the health risk message. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - DISCUSSION 
 
This study built on the cognitive experimental paradigm to study the effects of 
anxiety on the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli. Risk messages were 
conceptualized as being different from the types of ambiguous stimuli used in 
the traditional psychological paradigm. It seemed likely that ambiguous health 
messages would result in lower levels of threatening interpretations since 
there would be more leeway for interpretation, a range of possible degrees of 
threat and hence lower concern. This was in fact found to be partially the case. 
Ambiguous messages served somewhat as a baseline; in the case of non-
anxious participants, ambiguous and un-ambiguous risk messages evoked 
similar degrees of worry. In the case of high anxious participants, ambiguous 
messages evoked the same degree of worry as was evoked in the control 
group. However, higher worry was evoked in the state-anxiety induction group 
for the un-ambiguous messages. In other words, participants in the state-
anxiety induction group discriminated between the ambiguous and un-
ambiguous messages, while control group participants did not. 
 
Worry and the Interaction Effect 
 
In the traditional paradigm, ambiguity is interpreted in a more threatening 
manner under conditions of anxiety than under control conditions. In my study, 
ambiguous information was interpreted in largely the same way by treatment 
and control participants. It was the un-ambiguous messages that were 
interpreted as more worrisome by anxious participants. 
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What could have resulted in this discrimination?  
Before answers to this question are considered, the issue of induction and 
measurement of state-anxiety must be raised. The possibility cannot be ruled 
out that the treatment and control group did not differ in state-anxiety but 
differed in some other variable that remained unmeasured (for instance, 
cognitive arousal, self-presentation concerns raised by the public speaking 
task leading to greater environmental monitoring and so on). Only one state-
anxiety item showed evidence of a significant increase in state-anxiety over 
the course of the experimental task for the treatment group vs. the control 
group.  
 
At the same time it can be argued that state-anxiety measurements, like other 
self-report measurements that attempt to tap into current mood state, are 
subject to validity limitations (Schmukle and Egloff, 2004), including demand 
characteristics and a lack of awareness – this would make it unsurprising that 
a state-anxiety induction procedure that has been tested in past research and 
found to be effective (e.g. Schmukle and Egloff, 2004) did not show pre-post 
induction differences. In addition, the timing of the post-task state-anxiety 
evaluation might have been too delayed to capture inductions of state-anxiety 
done before the task.  
 
In another vein, Castro et al (1998) argue that the effects of mood state 
depend not on intensity of mood, but rather on the ‘cognitive context 
activation’. In other words, a weak mood induction could still result in treatment 
effects such as those seen in this study. This again leaves open the idea of 
just what this cognitive context activation would be given a public speaking 
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task and the particular topic on which it focused (smoking in public places). 
Participants did not focus only on health issues during their extempore public 
speaking task – they also focused on issues of civil freedoms, hygiene and 
personal stories. It cannot therefore be concluded that some health related 
cognitive network was activated and served as a framework for the 
experimental reading task. It is likely that the public speaking task increased 
overall levels of alertness (although as discussed below, reading times do not 
differ by treatment). In counterargument, it can be said that the treatment 
resulted in some affective rather than cognitive change since the effects of the 
treatment were on an affective variable (worry) rather than on a cognitive 
variable (susceptibility).   
 
Since its difficult to conclude about what differed between the treatment and 
control groups that created the interaction effect in predicting worry, 
explanations for the interaction effect are not straightforward. A few alternative 
hypotheses are considered below.  
 
One possibility for the interaction effect is that the state-anxiety induction 
resulted in either higher arousal (which is a conjecture and cannot be 
ascertained at this time) or in more strategic processing of messages. The 
time taken to read each message could be taken as a crude measure of 
strategic processing in that longer reading times could indicate more attention 
was paid. However, time to read messages (adjusted for length of message) 
does not vary by Treatment (F = 1.011, p = .320). In other words, time taken to 
read the message cannot be used to explain the discrimination between 




A more likely reason for higher concern levels for un-ambiguous messages in 
the Treatment group could be a higher discrimination for threat levels. Since 
the un-ambiguous messages are more unequivocal as to their threat levels, 
anxious readers likely interpret it as such. Blanchette and Richards (2003) 
found that anxious participants were more sensitive to the emotional context of 
stimuli, in that they made more contextually appropriate interpretations than 
did non-anxious participants. As mentioned earlier, context can be 
conceptualized both as a stimulus characteristic and as personal 
context/covariate. Which of these two meanings of context can best explain 
the difference found between ambiguous and un-ambiguous messages for 
anxious participants?  
 
An explanation based on context as personal covariate can be argued on two 
grounds, both of which seem unlikely. Firstly, it can be argued that if risk 
profile information interacts with either Treatment or Ambiguity it could 
potentially explain the interaction of Treatment and Ambiguity. However, 
personal context or risk profile information did not interact with either 
Treatment or Ambiguity (nor was there a three way interaction of 
Treatment/Ambiguity/Context) and it therefore seems unlikely that personal 
context had anything more than a main effect. The second argument could be 
that the Treatment or state-anxiety induction condition resulted in a greater 
retrievability of threat related information from memory (in this case, threat 
related information can be taken to mean risk profile information). However, 
the time taken to respond to the question on risk profile (which could serve as 
a crude measure of the retrievability of threat related information) did not vary 
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by Treatment – in other words, state-anxiety induction did not result in a faster 
reaction time to questions about risk profile (F = .474, p = .495 ).  
 
Therefore, it seems more likely that this interaction effect is a result of the 
context of the stimulus itself. That is, anxious participants were more sensitive 
in discriminating between disambiguation and ambiguation. 
 
In sum, contrary to the predominant paradigm, mood-congruent effects were 
only found for un-ambiguous messages.  
 
Worry and Perceived susceptibility 
 
While it might be tempting to conclude that the measures of worry and 
perceived susceptibility adequately capture severity and susceptibility (the two 
components of risk perception, Rimal, 2001) respectively, it is more likely that 
both capture susceptibility in some sense; this is because both measures are 
personalized and do not ask about the severity of the claim except in 
connection with the self. The worry measure is however probably tapping 
more into affective elements of susceptibility than is the perceived 
susceptibility measure. It can also be said that the two measures reflect a 
numerical vs. verbal approach to measuring uncertainty. 
 
Research into numerical and verbal measures indicates that verbal measures 
are more closely linked to behavioral intentions than are numerical measures 
of uncertainty (Windschitl and Wells, 1996). This finding can be mapped onto 
this study even though worry and perceived susceptibility are not exactly 
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measuring uncertainty. However, the numerical measure used in the 
Windschitl and Wells (1996) study are akin to those used in this study (using a 
similar 0 to 100% scale). The present research extends this finding somewhat 
in that worry is more predictive of motivation to seek more information (F 
(df:277.736 ) = 64.623, p = .000 )than is perceived susceptibility (F (df:275.712 
) = 0.970, p = .326 ).  
 
Information seeking is often cast as a behavioral outcome (Rimal, 2001) and 
the present research indicates that the affective measure of worry is a better 
predictor of behavior than is the perceived susceptibility measure. This gives 
credence to the recommendation that affective measures such as worry 
should be more widely employed in risk research.  
 
Attributional confidence and ambiguity 
 
While Ambiguity had a main effect on worry, attributional confidence did not 
significantly discriminate between ambiguous and un-ambiguous messages, 
implying that this was not a valid measure for ascertaining felt ambiguity. On 
the other hand, as was true of worry and perceived susceptibility, risk profile 
information significantly predicted attributional confidence. In other words, the 
higher a reader perceived their own risk profile to be, the more confidence 
they had in using the message to guide decision making. Attributional 
confidence was not related to any inherent characteristics of the message, but 
rather to the relevance of the message to the individual. However, the 
response latency for attributional confidence did vary by Ambiguity implying 
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that more time was required to make judgments about the self-reported 






There are some possible limits to the generalizability of these results. To begin 
with, it is not clear what cognitive / affective changes were actually brought 
about in the treatment condition. This makes it harder to generalize the effects 
of the treatment condition to real-world situations relevant to the health risk 
substantive domain. For instance, it can be assumed that a common situation 
of state-anxiety with respect to health risks might be an individual doing a 
strategic, intentional search for information on a particular health topic about 
which they are already concerned.  
 
The ambiguation of messages focused on causation claims and not on, for 
instance, response efficacy claims (that is, claims about the efficacy of 
behavioral recommendations for alleviating risk; Rimal, 2001). Ambiguation 
might therefore have different effects when different aspects of health risk 
messages are made ambiguous. 
 
The sample was small and homogeneous. While the sample at the level of 
messages was large (each of the 52 participants read 6 messages; hence 52 
x 6), the sample size at the between-factor level was small (26 participants in 
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each group). Further, all participants were young students and results might 
be limited to this population. 
 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
This study attempted to address some of the limitations of the experimental 
psychological paradigm on the interpretation of ambiguity. Firstly, the current 
research uses naturalistic texts, rather than single words or sentences or 
hypothetical situations. Secondly, a measure of ambiguity is used to assess 
perceived ambiguity for health risk messages – neither the psychological 
paradigm nor the communication research paradigm tend to use perceived 
ambiguity measures such as attributional confidence. Finally, the notion of 
context was expanded to refer not only to sentential frames, but also personal 
knowledge structures that are likely to be activated while reading.  
 
This study also has some interesting implications for the formulation of health 
risk messages. It appears that under normal, i.e. control, conditions, there was 
no difference found between ambiguous and un-ambiguous messages – 
readers were not able to differentiate between the messages, perhaps 
because the manipulation was subtle and they were not reading with any 
strategic comprehension tasks in mind (that is, they were reading under 
normal conditions, and not in a situation where they would be likely to pay 




An important finding for this study was the critical role of personal context or 
risk profile information in the interpretation of health risk messages. The 
measurement of this variable is straightforward and behaviorally oriented; it is 
not an attitudinal or perceptual measure. Given its predictive power with 
respect to a range of dependent variables (worry, perceived susceptibility, 
attributional confidence), and its almost ‘objective’ behavioral nature, it seems 
to be a very useful variable that should be more used in risk research. 
 
In addition, worry emerged as a useful variable for risk research since it had 
higher predictive power for information seeking than did susceptibility as 
commonly measured (using 100 point scales).  
 
Future research could focus on better understanding the precise mechanisms 
by which the Treatment and Ambiguity interaction effect arises. Studies could 
also investigate the effects of varying degrees or manifestations of uncertainty. 
Future research could also attempt a more complete understanding of exactly 
how popular texts of various kinds (pharmaceutical prescription advices, 
articles) on various topics (the controversial and un-controversial) encode 
ambiguity. A detailed content analysis into this question does not seem to exist 
in the literature at present. 
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Excessive caffeine intake might increase the possible risk of osteoporosis later 
in life. It is suggested that caffeine might be a diuretic, and therefore might 
increase calcium loss in the urine.  
For every 150 milligrams of caffeine (found in approximately an 8-ounce cup of 
coffee or 2 ½ cans of caffeinated soda), approximately five milligrams of 
calcium can be excreted out in the urine. This loss can add up and could be 
detrimental for your bones.  
 
Un-ambiguous Version 
Excessive caffeine intake increases the risk of osteoporosis later in life. 
Caffeine is a diuretic and increases calcium loss in the urine.  
For every 150 milligrams of caffeine (an 8-ounce cup of coffee or 2 ½ cans of 
caffeinated soda), five milligrams of calcium is excreted out in the urine. This 





Message 2 is about health risks associated with Lyme disease, common in 
North Eastern USA. Press CONTINUE... 
 
Ambiguous Version 
Some studies indicate that people who spend time outdoors in areas with high 
vegetation may be at risk for Lyme disease. Lyme disease is likely caused by 
deer ticks, and the symptoms are most often a characteristic "bull's-eye" rash, 
probably accompanied by fever, fatigue, headaches, muscle aches (myalgia), 
and joint aches (arthralgia). 
 
Un-ambiguous Version 
People who spend time in areas with high vegetation are at risk for Lyme 
disease. Lyme disease is caused by deer ticks, and the symptoms are a 
characteristic "bull's-eye" rash, accompanied by such as fever, fatigue, 













Knee Arthritis is said to be a sort of excessive and premature wear-and-tear of 
the cartilage that “cushions” the bone surfaces in a joint. A possible cause for 
knee arthritis could be putting excessive strain on the joint (e.g. such as 
happens to a certain extent from jogging).  
The symptoms of arthritis possibly include: the joint might not handle as high a 
load as before, there may be difficulty in flexing or straightening the joint fully, 
some irritation/pain and "heating up". 
 
Un-ambiguous Version 
Knee arthritis is excessive and premature wear-and-tear of the cartilage that 
cushions the bone surfaces in a joint. The causes for knee arthritis include 
putting excessive strain on the joint (e.g. from jogging).  
The characteristic symptoms of arthritis are: the joint does not handle as high 
a load as before, difficulty in flexing or straightening the joint fully, 









The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) released some new data on 
acrylamide levels in about 750 new food samples. Some scientists contend 
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that acrylamide is probably a natural byproduct, most likely of frying, baking or 
roasting in certain potato-based and carbohydrate-rich foods, such as potato 
chips, pretzels and popcorn.  
Two years ago Swedish researchers made a possible connection between 
acrylamides and cancer. "So far, our data suggests that perhaps acrylamides 
cause cancer and reproductive problems in animals and could potentially be a 
neurotoxin in humans," the FDA said in a statement. 
 
Un-ambiguous Version The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) released 
new data on acrylamide levels in 750 new food samples. Acrylamide is a 
natural byproduct of frying, baking or roasting potato-based and other 
carbohydrate-rich foods, such as potato chips, pretzels and popcorn.  
Two years ago Swedish researchers made the connection between 
acrylamides and cancer. "To date, acrylamide is known to cause cancer and 
reproductive problems in animals at high doses and is a neurotoxin in humans 









Epidemiological research has found a possible link between mobile phone 
usage and cancer. Research found both biological indications of changes in 
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chromosomal structure of blood cells and a correlation between mobile phone 
usage and certain types of brain cancer.  
Researchers say that radio-frequency (RF) “radiation” from cell phones can 
cause cancer probably by forcing the body to produce somewhat higher than 
usual levels of heat shock proteins. Studies have shown that cell phone use 
might increase a person’s risk of developing a fairly rare tumor on the side of 
the head where the phone is normally held. 
 
Un-ambiguous Version 
Epidemiological research has found a link between mobile phone usage and 
cancer. Research found both biological changes in chromosomal structure of 
blood cells and a correlation between mobile phone usage and brain cancer.  
Researchers say that radio-frequency (RF) radiation from cell phones causes 
cancer by forcing the body to produce high levels of heat shock proteins. 
Studies have shown that cell phone use increased a person’s risk of 





Message 6 is about health risks associated with eating foods high in 
cholesterol. Press CONTINUE... 
 
Ambiguous Version 
Cholesterol levels might be relevant in young adults since it has been shown 
that atherosclerosis probably begins during the teen years and early 20s. High 
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cholesterol levels in young adulthood are one of the possible factors that could 
significantly increase the risk for developing some type of CHD (coronary heart 
disease) later in life. The Framingham Heart Study suggested that in some 
young adults, higher cholesterol levels were related to lower longevity and to 
some extent, higher cardiovascular mortality. 
 
Un-ambiguous Version 
Cholesterol levels are important in young adults since atherosclerosis begins 
during the teen years and early 20s. High cholesterol levels in young 
adulthood significantly increases the risk for developing CHD (coronary heart 
disease) later in life. The Framingham Heart Study showed that young adults 
with higher cholesterol levels have lower longevity and higher cardiovascular 
mortality.
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APPENDIX B – AMBIGUITY SCALE 
Questionnaire 1: Instructions 
Please respond to the following statements by indicating the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with them. Use the scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means 
strongly disagree and 7 means strongly agree.  
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Moderately disagree 
3. Slightly disagree 
4. Neither agree nor disagree 
5. Slightly agree 
6. Moderately agree 





An expert who doesn't come up with a definite answer probably 
doesn't know too much.  
 
I would like to live in a foreign country for a while.   
There is really no such thing as a problem that can't be solved.   
People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss most of the 
joy of living.  
 
A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be 
done are always clear.  
 
It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a 




Ambiguity Scale continued… 
 
In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, 
simple problems rather than large and complicated ones.  
 
Often the most interesting and stimulating people are those who 
don't mind being different and original.  
 
What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar.   
People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don't know how 
complicated things really are.  
 
A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or 
unexpected happenings arise really has a lot to be grateful for.  
 
Many of our most important decisions are based upon insufficient 
information.  
 
I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones 
where all or most of the people are complete strangers.  
 
Teachers or supervisors who hand out vague assignments give 
one a chance to show initiative and originality.  
 
The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better.   
A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of 




APPENDIX C – STATE-ANXIETY SCALE 
 
Questionnaire 2: Instructions 
There are a number of pairs of opposites listed below. These phrases are 
used by people to describe their current feeling state. For each pair of 
statements, please respond in terms of how you feel right now. There are no 
right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any one pair but give 
the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.  
 
Extremely tired      Not at all tired 
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9           10 
 
Very relaxed          Very tense 
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9           10 
 
Very excited        Not at all excited 
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9           10 
 
Very hungry           Not at all hungry 
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9           10 
 
Feel at ease        Not at all at ease 





Feel pleasant       Not at all 
pleasant 
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9           10 
 
Very jittery        Not at all jittery 
1          2          3          4          5          6          7          8          9           10 
 
Very worried        Not at all worried 





APPENDIX D - DEPENDENT MEASURES 
 
Worry 
How WORRIED do you feel about this health risk? Please enter a number 
from 1 to 5, where 1 means not at all worried and 5 means very worried. 
 
Perceived susceptibility 
How would you rate your PERSONAL RISK for this health problem? Please 
enter a number from 0 to 100 scale, where 0 is certain not to be affected and 
100 is certain to be affected. 
 
Risk profile question for Message 1 
On average, how many cups of coffee or cans of caffeinated soda do you 
drink in a day? Please enter a number in the space below. 
 
Risk profile question for Message 2 
Have you engaged in any of these outdoor activities in the last one year? 
Check all that apply. 
Hiking 
Barbecuing outside 
Sitting on grass 
Swimming in a gorge 
 
Risk profile question for Message 3 
Do you jog on a hard surface, such as a road? (YES/NO) 
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Risk profile question for Message 4 
How often do you eat potato chips or other fried potato products?  
Rarely / never 
1 - 2 times a month 
3 - 4 times a month 
2 - 3 times a week 
4 - 5 times a week 
Almost everyday 
 
Risk profile question for Message 5 
On average, how long each day do you use your mobile phone? 
I do not have a mobile phone 
Less than 10 minutes  
Between 10 minutes to half an hour 
Between half an hour to one hour 
Between one to two hours 
More than two hours 
 
 
Risk profile question for Message 6 
How often do you eat foods high in fat content, such as fries, hamburgers, 
pizza and chocolate?  
Rarely / never 
1 - 2 times a month 
3 - 4 times a month 
2 - 3 times a week 
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How CONFIDENT are you in using the information presented in this message 
to guide your health decisions? Please enter a number from 1 to 5, where 1 
means not at all confident and 5 means very confident. 
 
Motivation to seek information   
Are you likely to seek out more information on this health risk? Please enter a 
number from 1 to 5, where 1 means not at all likely to seek more information 
and 5 means very likely to seek more information. 
 
Relevance 
How RELEVANT do you think this information is for you? Please enter a 
number from 1 to 5, where 1 is not at all relevant and 5 is very relevant. 
 
Familiarity 
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